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Abstract Taking a rigorous formal approach, we consider sequential deci-
sion problems involving observable variables, unobservable variables, and ac-
tion variables. We can typically assume the property of extended stability,
which allows identification (by means of “G-computation”) of the consequence
of a specified treatment strategy if the “unobserved” variables are, in fact,
observed—but not generally otherwise. However, under certain additional spe-
cial conditions we can infer simple stability (or sequential ignorability), which
supports G-computation based on the observed variables alone. One such ad-
ditional condition is sequential randomization, where the unobserved variables
essentially behave as random noise in their effects on the actions. Another is
sequential irrelevance, where the unobserved variables do not influence future
observed variables. In the latter case, to deduce sequential ignorability in full
generality requires additional positivity conditions. We show here that these
positivity conditions are not required when all variables are discrete.
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1 Introduction
We are often concerned with controlling some variable of interest through a
sequence of consecutive actions. An example in a medical context is maintain-
ing a critical variable, such as blood pressure, within an appropriate risk-free
range. To achieve such control, the doctor will administer treatments over a
number of stages, taking into account, at each stage, a record of the patient’s
history, that provides him with information on the level of the critical variable,
and possibly other related measurements, as well as the patient’s reactions to
the treatments applied in preceding stages. Consider, for instance, practices
followed after events such as stroke, pulmonary embolism or deep vein throm-
bosis (Rosthøj et al, 2006; Sterne et al, 2009). The aim of such practices is
to keep the patient’s prothrombin time (international normalized ratio, INR)
within a recommended range. Such efforts are not confined to a single decision
and instant allocation of treatment, marking the end of medical care. Rather,
they are effected over a period of time, with actions being decided and applied
at various stages within this period, based on information available at each
stage. So the patient’s INR and related factors will be recorded throughout
this period, along with previous actions taken, and at each stage all the in-
formation so far recorded, as well, possibly, as other, unrecorded information,
will form the basis upon which the doctor will decide on allocation of the
subsequent treatment.
A well-specified algorithm that takes as input the recorded history of a
patient at each stage and gives as output the choice of the next treatment
to be allocated constitutes a dynamic decision strategy. Such a strategy gives
guidance to the doctor on how to take into account the earlier history of
the patient, including reactions to previous treatments, in allocating the next
treatment. There can be an enormous number of such strategies, having dif-
fering impacts on the variable of interest. We should like to have criteria to
evaluate these strategies, and so allow us to choose the one that is optimal for
our problem (Murphy, 2003).
In this paper we develop and extend the decision-theoretic approach to this
problem described by Dawid and Didelez (2010). A problem that complicates
the evaluation of a strategy is that the data we possess were typically not gener-
ated by applying that strategy, but arose instead from an observational study.
We thus seek conditions, which we shall express in decision-theoretic terms,
under which we can identify the components we need to evaluate a strategy
from such data. When appropriate conditions are satisfied, the G-computation
algorithm introduced by Robins (1986, 1992) allows us to evaluate a strategy
on the basis of observational data. Our decision-theoretic formulation of this
is closely related to the seminal work of Robins (1986, 1987, 1989, 1997), but
is, we consider, more readily interpretable.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In § 2 we detail our notation, and de-
scribe the G-recursion algorithm for evaluating an interventional strategy. We
next discuss the problem of identifiability, which asks when observational data
can be used to evaluate a strategy. Distinguishing between the observational
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and interventional regimes, we highlight the need for conditions that would al-
low us to transfer information across regimes, and thus support observational
evaluation of an interventional strategy.
In § 3 we describe the decision-theoretic framework, by means of which we
can formulate such conditions formally in a simple and comprehensible way,
and so address our questions. In particular, we show how the language and
calculus of conditional independence supply helpful tools that we can exploit
to attack the problem of evaluating a strategy from observational data.
In § 4 we introduce simple stability, the most straightforward condition
allowing us to evaluate a strategy, by means of G-recursion, from observa-
tional data. However, in many problems this condition is not easily defensible,
so in § 5 we explore other conditions, in particular conditions we term se-
quential randomization and sequential irrelevance. We investigate when these
are sufficient to induce simple stability (and therefore observational evalu-
ation of a strategy), and discuss their limitations. In particular, we show
that, when all variables are discrete, we can drop the requirement of posi-
tivity that is otherwise required to deduce simple stability when sequential
irrelevance holds. Counter-example 5.6, as well as Counter-example A.1 and
Counter-example A.2 in the Appendix, shows the need for positivity in more
general problems. Section 7 presents some concluding comments.
2 A sequential decision problem
We are concerned with evaluating a specified multistage procedure that aims
to affect a specific outcome variable of interest through a sequence of interven-
tions, each responsive to observations made thus far. As an example we can
take the case of HIV disease. We consider evaluating strategies that, aiming
to suppress the virus and stop disease progression, recommend when to initi-
ate antiretroviral therapy for HIV patients based on their history record. This
history will take into account the CD4 count (Sterne et al, 2009), as well as
additional variables relevant to the disease.
2.1 Notation and terminology
We consider two sets of variables: L, a set of observable variables, and A,
a set of action variables. We term the variables in L ∪ A domain variables.
An alternating ordered sequence I := (L1, A1, . . . , Ln, An, Ln+1 ≡ Y ) with
Li ⊆ L and Ai ∈ A defines an information base, the interpretation being that
the specified variables are observed in this time order. We will adopt notation
conventions such as (L1, L2) for L1 ∪ L2, Li for (L1, . . . , Li), etc..
The observable variables L represent initial or intermediate symptoms, re-
actions, personal information, etc., observable between consecutive treatments,
over which we have no direct control; they are perceived as generated and re-
vealed by Nature. The action variables A represent the treatments, which we
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could either control by external intervention, or else leave to Nature to deter-
mine. Thus at each stage i we will have a realization of the random variable (or
set of random variables) Li ⊆ L, followed by a value for the variable Ai ∈ A.
After the realization of the final An ∈ A, we will observe the outcome variable
Ln+1 ∈ L, which we also denote by Y .
For any stage i, a configuration hi := (l1, a1, . . . , ai−1, li) of the variables
(L1, A1, . . . , Ai−1, Li) constitutes a partial history. A clearly described way of
specifying, for each action Ai, its value ai as a function of the partial history hi
to date defines a strategy: the values (li, ai−1) of the earlier domain variables
(Li, Ai−1) can thus be taken into account in determining the current and
subsequent actions.
In a static, or atomic, strategy, the sequence of actions is predetermined, en-
tirely unaffected by the information provided by the Li’s. In a non-randomized
dynamic strategy we specify, for each stage i and each partial history hi, a fixed
value ai of Ai, that is then to be applied. We can also consider randomized
strategies , where for each stage i and associated partial history hi we specify
a probability distribution for Ai, so allowing randomization of the decision
for the next action. In this paper we consider general randomized strategies,
since we can regard static and non-randomized strategies as special cases of
these. Then all the Li’s and Ai’s have the formal status of random variables.
We write e.g. E(Li | Ai−1, Li−1 ; s) to denote any version of the conditional
expectation E(Li | Ai−1, Li−1) under the joint distribution Ps generated by
following strategy s, and “a.s. [Ps]” to denote that an event has probability 1
under Ps.
2.2 Evaluating a strategy
Suppose we want to identify the effect of some strategy s on the outcome
variable Y : we then need to be able to assess the overall effect that the action
variables have on the distribution of Y . An important application is where we
have a loss L(y) associated with each outcome y of Y , and want to compute
the expected loss E{L(Y )} under the distribution for Y induced by following
strategy s. We shall see in § 4 below that, if we know or can estimate the
conditional distribution, under this strategy, of each observable variable Li
(i = 1, . . . , n+ 1) given the preceding variables in the information base, then
we would be able to compute E{L(Y )}. Following this procedure for each
contemplated strategy, we could compare the various strategies, and so choose
that minimizing expected loss.
In order to evaluate a particular strategy of interest, we need to be able
to mimic the experimental settings that would give us the data we need to
estimate the probabilistic structure of the domain variables. Thus suppose that
we wish to evaluate a specified non-randomized strategy for a certain patient
P , and consider obtaining data under two different scenarios.
The first scenario corresponds to precisely the strategy that we wish to
evaluate: that is, the doctor knows the prespecified plan defined by the strat-
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egy, and at each stage i, taking into account the partial history hi, he allocates
to patient P the treatment that the strategy recommends. The expected loss
E{L(Y )} computed under the distribution of Y generated by following this
strategy is exactly what we need to evaluate it.
Now consider a second scenario. Patient P does not take part in the ex-
periment described above, but it so happens he has received exactly the same
sequence of treatments that would be prescribed by that strategy. However,
the doctor did not decide on the treatments using the strategy, but based on a
combination of criteria, that might have involved variables beyond the domain
variables L ∪ A. For example, the doctor might have taken into account, at
each stage, possible allergies or personal preferences for certain treatments of
patient P , variables that the strategy did not encompass.
Because these extra variables are not recorded in the data, the analyst does
not know them. Superficially, both scenarios appear to be the same, since the
variables recorded in each scenario are the same. However, without further
assumptions there is no reason to believe that they have arisen from the same
distribution.
We call the regime described in the first scenario above an interventional
regime, to reflect the fact that the doctor was intervening in a specified fash-
ion (which we assume known to the analyst), according to a given strategy for
allocating treatment. We call the regime described in the second scenario an
observational regime, reflecting the fact that the analyst has just been observ-
ing the sequence of domain variables, but does not know just how the doctor
has been allocating treatments.
Data actually generated under the interventional regime would provide
exactly the information required to evaluate the strategy. However, typically
the data available will not have been generated this way—and in any case
there are so many possible strategies to consider that it would not be humanly
possible to obtain such experimental data for all of them. Instead, the analyst
may have observed how patients (and doctors) respond, in a single, purely
observational, regime. Direct use of such observational data, as if generated by
intervention, though tempting, can be very misleading. For example, suppose
the analyst wants to estimate, at each stage i, the conditional distribution of
Li given (Li−1, Ai−1) in the interventional regime (which he has not observed),
using data from the observational regime (which he has). Since all the variables
in this conditional distribution have been recorded in the observational regime,
he might instead estimate (as he can) the conditional distribution of Li given
(Li−1, Ai−1) in the observational regime, and consider this as a proxy for its
interventional counterpart. However, since the doctor may have been taking
account of other variables, that the analyst has not recorded and so can not
adjust for, this estimate will typically be biased, often seriously so. One of the
main aims of this paper is to consider conditions under which the bias due to
such potential confounding disappears.
For simplicity, we assume that all the domain variables under consideration
can be observed for every patient. However, the context in which we observe
these variables will determine if and how we can use the information we col-
6 A. P. Dawid and P. Constantinou
lect. The decision-theoretic approach we describe below takes into account the
different circumstances of the different regimes by introducing a parameter to
identify which regime is under consideration at any point. In order to tackle
issues such as the potential for bias introduced by making computations un-
der a regime distinct from that we are interested in evaluating, we will need
to make assumptions relating the probabilistic behaviours under the differing
regimes. Armed with such understanding of the way the regimes interconnect,
we can then investigate whether, and if so how, we can transfer information
from one regime to another.
2.3 Consequence of a strategy
We seek to calculate the expectation E{k(Y ) ; s} (always assumed to exist)
of some given function k(·) of Y in a particular interventional regime s; for
example, k(·) could be a loss function, k(y) ≡ L(y), associated with the out-
come of Y . We shall use the term consequence of s to denote the expectation
E{k(Y ) ; s} of k(Y ) under the contemplated interventional regime s.
Assuming (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ) has a joint density in interventional
regime s, we can factorize it as:
p(y, l, a ; s) =
{
n+1∏
i=1
p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; s)
}
×
{
n∏
i=1
p(ai | li, ai−1 ; s)
}
(1)
with ln+1 ≡ y.
2.3.1 G-recursion
If we knew all the terms on the right-hand side of (1), we could in principle
compute the joint density for (Y, L,A) under strategy s, hence, by marginal-
ization, the density of Y , and finally the desired consequence E{k(Y ); s}. How-
ever, a more efficient way to compute this is by means of the G-computation
formula introduced by Robins (1986). Here we describe the recursive formu-
lation of this formula, G-recursion, generalising the argument in the discrete
case presented by Dawid and Didelez (2010).
Let h denote a partial history of the form (li, ai−1) or (li, ai) (0 ≤ i ≤ n+1).
We denote the set of all partial histories by H. Fixing a regime s ∈ S, define
a function f on H by:
f(h) := E{k(Y ) | h ; s}. (2)
Note: When we are dealing with non-discrete distributions (and also in the
discrete case when there are non-trivial events of Ps-probability 0), the condi-
tional expectation on the right-hand side of (2) will not be uniquely defined,
but can be altered on a set of histories which has Ps-probability 0. Thus we
are in fact requiring, for each i:
f(Li, Ai) := E{k(Y ) | Li, Ai; s} a.s. [Ps] (3)
A Formal Treatment of Sequential Ignorability 7
(and similarly when the argument is (Li, Ai−1)). And we allow the left-hand
side of (2) to be any selected version of the conditional expectation on the
right-hand side.
For any versions of these conditional expectations, applying the law of
repeated expectation yields:
f(Li, Ai−1) = E
{
f(Li, Ai) | Li, Ai−1 ; s)
}
a.s. [Ps] (4)
f(Li−1, Ai−1) = E
{
f(Li, Ai−1 | Li−1, Ai−1 ; s)
}
a.s. [Ps]. (5)
For h a full history (ln, an, y), we have f(h) = k(y). Using these starting values,
by successively implementing (4) and (5) in turn, starting with (5) for i = n+1
and ending with (5) for i = 1, we step down through ever shorter histories
until we have computed f(∅) = E{k(Y ) ; s}, the consequence of regime s. Note
that this equality is only guaranteed to hold almost surely, but since both sides
are constants they must be the same constant. In particular, it can not matter
which version of the conditional expectations we have chosen in conducting
the above recursion: in all cases we will exit with the desired consequence
E{k(Y ) ; s}.
2.4 Using observational data
In order to compute E{k(Y ) ; s}, whether directly from (1) or usingG-recursion,
(4) and (5), we need (versions of) the following conditional distributions under
Ps:
(i) Ai | Li, Ai−1, for i = 1, . . . , n.
(ii) Li | Li−1, Ai−1, for i = 1, . . . , n+ 1.
Since s is an interventional regime, corresponding to a well-defined (pos-
sibly randomized) treatment strategy, the conditional distributions in (i) are
fully specified by the treatment protocol. So we only need to get a handle
on each term of the form (ii). However, since we have not implemented the
strategy s, we do not have data directly relevant to this. Instead, we might
be tempted to use its observational counterpart, i.e. a version of the condi-
tional distribution of li | Li−1, Ai−1 in the observational regime Po, which is
(in principle) estimable from observational data. This will generally be a dan-
gerous ploy, since we are dealing with two quite distinct regimes, with strong
possibilities for confounding and other biases in the observational regime; how-
ever, it can be justifiable if we can impose suitable extra conditions, relating
the probabilistic behaviours of the different regimes. We therefore now turn
to a description of a general “decision-theoretic” framework that is useful for
expressing and manipulating such conditions.
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3 The decision-theoretic approach
In the decision-theoretic approach to causal inference, we proceed by making
suitable assumptions relating the probabilistic behaviours of stochastic vari-
ables across a variety of different regimes. These could relate to different lo-
cations, time-periods, or, in this paper, contexts (observational/interventional
regimes) in which observations can be made. We denote the set of all regimes
under consideration by S. We introduce a non-stochastic variable σ, the regime
indicator, taking values in S, to index these regimes and their associated prob-
ability distributions. Thus σ has the logical status of a parameter, rather than
a random variable: it specifies which (known or unknown) joint distribution is
operating over the domain variables L∪A. Any probabilistic statement about
the domain variables must, explicitly or implicitly, be conditional on some
specified value s ∈ S for σ.
We focus here on the case that we want to make inference about one
or more interventional regimes on the basis of data generated under an ob-
servational regime. So we take S = {o} ∪ S∗, where o is the observational
regime under which data have been gathered, and S∗ is the collection of con-
templated interventional strategies with respect to a given information base
(L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y ).
3.1 Conditional independence
In order to address the problem of making inference from observational data
we need to assume (and justify) some relationships between the probabilistic
behaviours of the variables in the differing regimes, interventional and observa-
tional. These assumptions will typically relate certain conditional distributions
across different regimes. The notation and calculus of conditional independence
(CI) turn out to be well-suited to express and manipulate such assumptions.
3.1.1 Conditional independence for stochastic variables
Let X,Y, Z, . . . be random variables defined on the same probability space
(Ω,A, P ). We write X ⊥⊥ Y | Z [P ], or just X ⊥⊥ Y | Z when P is under-
stood, to denote that X is independent of Y given Z under P : this can be in-
terpreted as requiring that the conditional distribution, under P , of X , given
Y = y and Z = z, depends only on y and not further on the value z of
Z. More formally, we require that, for any bounded real measurable function
h(X), there exists a measurable function w(Z) such that
E{h(X) |Y, Z} = w(Z) a.s. [P ]. (6)
Stochastic CI so defined has various general properties, of which the most
important are the following—which can indeed be used as axioms of an inde-
pendent “calculus of CI” (Dawid, 1979a, 2001; Pearl, 1988).
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Theorem 3.1
P1 (Symmetry) X ⊥⊥ Y | Z ⇒ Y ⊥⊥ X | Z
P2 X ⊥⊥ Y | X
P3 (Decomposition) X ⊥⊥ Y | Z, W  Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥ W | Z
P4 (Weak Union) X ⊥⊥ Y | Z, W  Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥ Y | (W,Z)
P5 (Contraction) X ⊥⊥ Y | Z and X ⊥⊥ W | (Y, Z) ⇒ X ⊥⊥ (Y,W ) | Z
(Here W  Y is used to denote that W = f(Y ) for some measurable function
f .)
These properties can be shown to hold universally for random variables on
a common probability space (Constantinou, 2013).
3.1.2 Extended conditional independence
We can generalize the property X ⊥⊥ Y | Z by allowing either or both of Y, Z
to be or contain non-stochastic elements, such as parameters or regime indi-
cators (Dawid, 1979a, 1980, 1998): in this case we talk of extended conditional
independence. Thus let σ denote the non-stochastic regime indicator. Infor-
mally, we interpret X ⊥⊥ σ | Z as saying that the conditional distribution of
X , given Z = z, under regime σ = s, depends only on z and not further on
the value s of σ; that is to say, the conditional distribution of X given Z is the
same in all regimes. Note that this is exactly the form of “causal assumption”,
allowing transfer of probabilistic information across regimes, that we might
wish to apply.
More formally, let {Ps : s ∈ S} be a family of distributions, and X , Y ,
Z,. . . random variables, on a measure space (Ω,A). We introduce the non-
stochastic regime indicator variable σ taking values in S, and interpret condi-
tioning on σ = s to mean that we are computing under distribution Ps.
Definition 3.1 We say that X is (conditionally) independent of Y given
(Z, σ) and write X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z, σ), if for any bounded real measurable func-
tion h(X), there exists a function w(σ, Z), measurable in Z, such that, for all
s ∈ S,
E{h(X) | Y, Z ; s} = w(s, Z) a.s. [Ps].
Definition 3.2 We say that X is (conditionally) independent of (Y, σ) given
Z, and write X ⊥⊥ (Y, σ) | Z, if for any bounded real measurable function
h(X), there exists a measurable function w(Z) such that, for all s ∈ S,
E{h(X) | Y, Z ; s} = w(Z) a.s. [Ps]. (7)
Remark 3.1
1. Note the similarity of (7) to (6). In particular the function w(Z) must not
depend on the regime s ∈ S operating.
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2. When X , Y and Z are discrete random variables, X ⊥⊥ (Y, σ) | Z if and
only if there exists a function w(X,Z) such that, for any s ∈ S,
P (X = x |Y = y, Z = z ; s) = w(x, z)
whenever P (Y = y, Z = z ; s) > 0.
3. For each s ∈ S, the equality in (7) is permitted to fail on a set As, which
may vary with s, that has probability 0 under Ps.
4. The requirement of (7) is that there exist a single function w(Z) that
can serve as the conditional expectation of h(X) given (Y, Z) in every
distribution Ps; but this does not imply that any version of this condi-
tional expectation under one value of s will serve for all values of s: see
Counter-example A.1 for a counter-example, and Dawid (1979b) for cases
where a lack of understanding of similar problems associated with null
events has led to serious errors. However we can sometimes escape this
problem by imposing an additional positivity condition: see § 4.1 below.
3.1.3 Connexions
In this section we impose the additional condition that the set S of possible
regimes be finite or countable, and endow it with the σ-field F of all its subsets.
We can construct the product measure space (Ω∗,A∗) := (Ω × S,A ⊗
F), and regard all the stochastic variables X,Y, Z, . . . as defined on (Ω∗,A∗);
moreover σ can also be considered as a random variable on (Ω∗,A∗).
Let Π be a probability measure on S, arbitrary subject only to giving
positive probability pi(s) > 0 to each point s ∈ S; and define, for any A∗ ∈ A∗:
P ∗(A) =
∑
s∈S
pi(s)Ps(As) (8)
where As = {ω ∈ Ω : (ω, s) ∈ A}. Under P ∗ the marginal distribution of σ
is Π , while the conditional distribution over Ω, given σ = s, is Ps. It is then
not hard to show (Constantinou, 2013) that X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z, σ) in the extended
sense of Definition 3.1 if and only if the purely stochastic interpretation of the
same expression holds under P ∗; and similarly for Definition 3.2. It follows
that, for the interpretations of extended conditional independence given in
§ 3.1.2, we can continue to apply all the properties P1–P5 of Theorem 3.1.
Any argument so constructed, in which all the premisses and conclusions are
so interpretable, will be valid—even when some of the intermediate steps are
not so interpretable (e.g., they could have the form σ ⊥⊥ X | Y ).
For the purposes of this paper we will only ever need to compare two
regimes at a time: the observational regime o and one particular interventional
regime s of interest. Then the properties P1–P5 of conditional independence
can always be applied, and equip us with a powerful machinery to pursue
identification of interventional quantities from observational data.
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3.1.4 Graphical representations
Graphical models in the form of influence diagrams (IDs) can sometimes be
used to represent collections of conditional independence properties amongst
the variables (both stochastic and non-stochastic) in a problem (Lauritzen et al,
1990; Dawid, 2002; Cowell et al, 2007). We can then use graphical techniques
(in particular, the d-separation, or the equivalent moralization, criterion) to
derive, in a visual and transparent way, implied conditional independence prop-
erties that follow from our assumptions. However, a graphical representation
is not always possible and never essential: all that can be achieved through
the graph-theoretic properties of IDs, and more, can be achieved using the
calculus of conditional independence (properties P1–P5).
4 Simple stability
We now use CI to express and explore some conditions that will allow us to
perform G-recursion for the strategy of interest on the basis of observational
data.
Consider first the conditional distribution (i) of Ai | Li, Ai−1 ; s as needed
for (4). This term requires knowledge of the mechanism that allocates the
treatment at stage i in the light of the preceding variables in the information
base. We assume that, for an interventional regime s ∈ S∗, this distribution
(degenerate for a non-randomized strategy) will be known a priori to the ana-
lyst, as it will be encoded in the strategy. In such a case we call s ∈ S∗ a control
strategy (with respect to the information base I = (L1, A1, . . . , LN , AN , Y )).
Next we consider how we might gain knowledge of the conditional dis-
tribution (ii) of Li | Li−1, Ai−1 ; s, as required for (5). This distribution is
unknown, and we need to explore conditions that will enable us to identify it
from observational data. As different distributions for the random variables
in the information base apply in the different regimes, the distribution of Li
given (Li−1, Ai−1) will typically depend on the regime operating.
Definition 4.1 We say that the problem exhibits simple stability1 with re-
spect to the information base I = (L1, A1, . . . , Ln, An, Y ) if, for each s ∈ S∗,
with σ denoting the non-random regime indicator taking values in {o, s}:
Li ⊥⊥ σ | (Li−1, Ai−1) (i = 1, . . . , n+ 1). (9)
Formally, simple stability requires that, for any bounded measurable func-
tion f(Li), there exist a single random variableW = w(Li−1, Ai−1) that serves
as a version of each of the conditional expectations E{f(Li) | (Li−1, Ai−1) ; o}
1This definition is slightly weaker than that of Dawid and Didelez (2010), as we are
only requiring a common version of the corresponding conditional expectations between
each single control strategy and the observational regime. We do not require that there exist
one function that can serve as common version across all regimes simultaneously.
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and E{f(Li) | (Li−1, Ai−1) ; s}. This property then extends to conditional ex-
pectations of functions of the form f(Li, Ai−1). In particular, this apparently
2
supports identification of the right-hand side of (5) with its observational coun-
terpart, so allowing observational estimation estimation of this expression.
Simple stability is a very strong assumption, and will be tenable only in
very special cases. It will be satisfied if, in the observational regime, the action
variables are physically sequentially randomized: then all unobserved poten-
tial confounding factors will, on average, be balanced between the treatment
groups. Alternatively, we might accept simple stability if, in the observational
regime, the allocation of treatment is decided taking into account only the
domain variables in the information base and nothing more: for example, if
we are observing a doctor whose treatment decisions are based only on the
domain variables we are recording, and no additional unrecorded information.
The ID describing simple stability (9) for i = 1, 2, 3 is shown in Figure 1.
The specific property (9) is represented by the absence of arrows from σ to
L1, L2, and L3 ≡ Y .
A1L1 A2L2 Y
σ
Fig. 1 Stability
4.1 Positivity
We have indicated that simple stability might allow us to identify the con-
sequence of a control strategy s on the basis of data from the observational
regime o. However, while this condition ensures the existence of a common
version of the relevant conditional expectation valid for both regimes, deriv-
ing this function from the observational regime alone might be problematic,
because versions of the same conditional expectation can differ on events of
probability 0, and we have not ruled out that an event having probability 0
in one regime might have positive probability in another. Thus we can only
obtain the desired function from the observational regime on a set that has
2but see § 4.1 below
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probability 1 in the observational regime; and this might not have probability
1 in the intervententional regime—see Counter-example A.1 in the Appendix
for a simple example of this.
To evade this problem, we can impose a condition requiring an event to have
zero probability in the interventional regime whenever it has zero probability
in the observational regime:
Definition 4.2 We say the problem exhibits positivity or absolute continuity
if, for any interventional regime s ∈ S∗, the joint distribution of (Ln, An, Y )
under Ps is absolutely continuous with respect to that under Po, i.e.:
Ps(E) > 0⇒ Po(E) > 0 (10)
for any event E defined in terms of (Ln, An, Y ).
Suppose we have both simple stability and positivity, and consider a bounded
function h(Li). Let W = w(Li−1, Ai−1) be any variable that serves both as a
version of E{h(Li) | Li−1, Ai−1 ; o} and as a version of E{h(Li) | Li−1, Ai−1 ; s};
such a variable is guaranteed to exist by (9). Let V = v(Li−1, Ai−1) be any
version of E{h(Li) | Li−1, Ai−1 ; o}. Since W too is a version of E{h(Li) |
Li−1, Ai−1 ; o}, V =W, a.s. [Po]. Hence, by (10), V =W, a.s. [Ps]. But sinceW
is a version of E{h(Li) | Li−1, Ai−1 ; s}, so too must be V . So we have shown
that any version of a conditional expectation calculated under Po will also
serve this purpose under Ps. In particular, when effecting the G-computation
algorithm of § 2.3.1, in (5) we are fully justified in replacing the conditional
expectation under Ps by (any version of) its counterpart under Po—which we
can in principle estimate from observational data.
4.1.1 Difficulties with continuous actions
When all variables are discrete, positivity will hold if and only if every partial
history that can occur with positive probability in the interventional regime
also has a positive probability in the observational regime. In particular, this
will hold for every interventional regime if every possible partial history can
occur with positive probability in the observational regime.
Even in this case we might well need vast quantities of observational data
to get good estimates of all the probabilities needed for substitution into the G-
recursion algorithm—that is the reason for our qualification “in principle” at
the end of § 4.1. In practice, even under positivity we would generally need to
impose some smoothness or modelling assumptions to get reasonable estimates
of the required observational distributions. However we do not explore these
issues here, merely noting that, given enough data to estimate these observa-
tional distributions, positivity allows us to transfer them to the interventional
regime.
When however we are dealing with continuous action variables—as, for ex-
ample, the dose of a medication—the positivity condition may become totally
unreasonable. For a very simple example, consider a single continuous action
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variable A and response variable Y . We might want to transfer the conditional
expectation E(Y |A) from the observational regime o, in which A arises from
a continuous distribution, to an interventional regime s, in which it is set to a
fixed value, A = a0. However, if we take any version of E(Y |A; o) and change
it, to anything we want, at the single point A = a0, we will still have a version
of E(Y |A; o). So we are unable to identify the desired E(Y |A; s) This is due
to the failure of positivity, since the 1-point interventional distribution of A is
not absolutely continuous with respect to the continuous observational distri-
bution of A. Positivity here would require that there be a positive probability
of observing the exact value a0 in the observational regime. But it would not
generally be reasonable to impose such a condition, and quite impossible to
do so for every value a0, that we might be potentially interested in setting for
A.
In such a case we might make progress by imposing further structure, such
as a model for E(Y |A; o) that is a continuous function of A, so identifying a
preferred version of this. Here however we shall avoid such problems by only
considering problems in which all action variables are discrete. Then we shall
have positivity whenever every action sequence a having positive interventional
probability also has positive observational probability, and the (uniquely de-
fined) conditional interventional distribution of all the non-action variables,
given A = a, is absolutely continuous with respect to its observational coun-
terpart. This will typically not be an unreasonable requirement. We note that
our set-up is still more general than the usual formulations of G-recursion,
which explicitly or implicitly assume that all variables are discrete.
5 Sequential ignorability
As we have alluded, simple stability will often not be a compelling assumption,
for example because of the suspected presence of unmeasured confounding vari-
ables, and we might not be willing to accept it without further justification.
Here we consider conditions that might seem more acceptable, and investi-
gate when these will, after all, imply simple stability—thus supporting the
application of G-recursion.
5.1 Extended stability and extended positivity
Let U denote a set of variables that, while they might potentially influence
actions taken under the observational regime, are not available to the decision
maker, and so are not included in his information base I := (L1, A1, . . . , Ln, An, Ln+1 ≡
Y ). We define the extended information base I ′ := (L1, U1, A1, . . . , Ln, Un, An, Ln+1),
with Ui denoting the variables in U realized just before actionAi is taken. How-
ever, while thus allowing Ui to influence Ai in the observational regime, we
still only consider interventional strategies where there is no such influence—
since the decision maker does not have access to the (Ui). This motivates an
extended formal definition of “control strategy” in this context:
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Definition 5.1 (Control strategy) A regime s is a control strategy if
Ai ⊥⊥ U i | (Li, Ai−1 ; s) (i = 1, . . . , n) (11)
and in addition, the conditional distribution of Ai, given (Li, Ai−1), under
regime s, is known to the analyst.
We again denote the set of interventional regimes corresponding to the control
strategies under consideration by S∗.
Definition 5.2 We say that the problem exhibits extended stability (with
respect to the extended information base I ′) if, for any s ∈ S∗, with σ denoting
the non-random regime indicator taking values in {o, s}:
(Li, Ui) ⊥⊥ σ | (Li−1, U i−1, Ai−1) (i = 1, . . . , n+ 1). (12)
Extended stability is formally the same as simple stability, but using a
different information base, where Li is expanded to (Li, Ui). The real difference
is that the extended information base is not available to the decision maker
in the interventional regime, so that his decisions can not take account of the
(Ui). An ID faithfully representing property (12) for i = 1, 2, 3 is shown in
Figure 2.3 The property (12) is represented by the absence of arrows from σ
to L1, U1, L2, U2 and Y . However, the diagram does not explicitly represent
the additional property (11), which implies that, when σ = s, the arrows into
A1 from U1 and into A2 from U1 and U2 can be dropped.
A1 A2
U1 U2
L2L1
σ
Y
Fig. 2 Extended stability
To evade problems with events of zero probability, we can extend Definition 4.2:
3Note that the IDs in this paper differ from those in Dawid and Didelez (2010).
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Definition 5.3 We say the problem exhibits extended positivity if, for any s ∈
S∗, the joint distribution of (Un, Ln, An, Y ) under Ps is absolutely continuous
with respect to that under Po, i.e.
Ps(E) > 0⇒ Po(E) > 0 (13)
for any event E defined in terms of (Ln, Un, An, Y ).
5.2 Sequential randomization
Extended stability represents the belief that, for each i, the conditional dis-
tribution of (Li, Ui), given all the earlier variables (Li−1, U i−1, Ai−1) in the
extended information base, is the same in the observational regime as in the
interventional regime. This will typically be defensible if we can argue that
we have included in L ∪ U all the variables influencing the actions in the
observational regime.
However extended stability, while generally more defensible than simple
stability, typically does not imply simple stability, which is what is required
to support G-recursion. But it may do so if we impose additional conditions.
Here and in § 5.4 below we explore two such conditions.
Our first is the following:
Condition 5.3 (Sequential randomization)
Ai ⊥⊥ U i | (Li, Ai−1 ; o) (i = 1, . . . , n). (14)
Taking account of (11), we see that (14) is equivalent to:
Ai ⊥⊥ U i | (Li, Ai−1 ; σ) (i = 1, . . . , n) (15)
where σ takes values in S = {o} ∪ S∗.
Under sequential randomization, the observational distribution of Ai, given
the earlier variables in the information base, would be unaffected by further
conditioning on the earlier unobservable variables, U i. Hence the (Ui) are
redundant for explaining the way in which actions are determined in the ob-
servational regime. While this condition will hold under a control strategy, in
the observational regime it requires that the only information that has been
used to assign the treatment at each stage is that supplied by the observable
variables. For example, sequential randomization will hold if the actions are
physically sequentially randomized within all levels of the earlier variables in
the information base. The following result is therefore unsurprising.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose we have both extended stability, (12) and sequential
randomization, (15). Then we have simple stability, (9).
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A1 A2
U1 U2
L2L1
σ
Y
Fig. 3 Sequential randomization
An ID faithfully representing the conditional independence relationships
assumed in Theorem 5.1, for i = 1, 2, 3, is shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 can be
obtained from Figure 2 on deleting the arrows into A1 from U1 and into A2
from U1 and U2, so representing (15). (However, as we shall see below in § 5.4,
in general such “surgery” on IDs can be hazardous.)
The conditional independence properties (9) characterising simple stabil-
ity can now be read off from Figure 3, by applying the d-separation or mor-
alization criteria. For a formal algebraic proof of Theorem 5.1, using just the
axioms of conditional independence as given in Theorem 3.1, see Theorem 6.1
of Dawid and Didelez (2010).4
Corollary 5.1 Suppose we have extended stability, sequential randomization,
and extended positivity. Then we can apply G-recursion to compute the conse-
quence of a strategy s ∈ S∗.
5.4 Sequential irrelevance
Consider now the following alternative condition:
Condition 5.5 (Sequential Irrelevance)
Li ⊥⊥ U i−1 | (Li−1, Ai−1 ; σ) (i = 1, . . . , n+ 1). (16)
Under sequential irrelevance, in both regimes the conditional distribution of
the observable variable(s) at stage i is unaffected by the history of unobservable
variables up to the previous stage i − 1, given the domain variables in the
information base up to the previous stage. In contrast to (15), (16) permits
the unobserved variables that appear in earlier stages to influence the next
action Ai (which can only happen in the observational regime)—but not the
4Note that, in either of these approaches, we can restrict σ to the two values o and s,
so fully justifying treating the non-stochastic variable σ as if it were stochastic.
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development of the subsequent observable variables (including the ultimate
response variable Y ). This condition will typically hold when at each stage
i the unobserved variable Ui, while possibly influencing the next observable
variable Li, does not affect the development of future L’s. An example might
be where the unobservable variables represent the inclination of the patient to
take the treatment: in this case one might expect Ui to affect the development
of Li but not subsequent L’s. In general, the validity of this assumption will
have to be justified in the context of the problem under study.
By analogy with the passage from Figure 2 to Figure 3, we might attempt
to represent the additional assumption (16) by removing from Figure 2 all
arrows from Uj to Li (j < i). This would yield Figure 4. On applying d-
A1 A2
U1 U2
L2L1
σ
Y
Fig. 4 Sequential irrelevance?
separation or moralization to Figure 4 we could then deduce the simple stabil-
ity property (9). However, this approach is not valid, since Figure 4 encodes
the property L2 ⊥⊥ σ | (L1, A1), which can not be derived from (12) and (16)
using only the “axioms” of Theorem 3.1. In fact there is no ID that faithfully
represents the combination of the properties (12) and (16), since these do not
form a recursive system. And indeed, in full generality, simple stability is not
implied by extended stability, (12), together with sequential irrelevance, (16),
as the following counter-example demonstrates.
Counter-example 5.6 Take n = 1, L = ∅ and U = {U}. The extended
information base is I ′ = (U,A, Y ). We suppose that, in both the observational
regime o and the interventional regime s, Y = 1 if A = U , else Y = 0. Also,
in each regime, the marginal distribution of U is uniform on [0, 1]. It remains
to specify the distribution of A, given U : we assume that, in regime o, A = U ,
while in regime s, A is uniform on [0, 1], independently of U .
It is readily seen that U ⊥⊥ σ and Y ⊥⊥ σ | (U,A). Thus we have extended
stability, (12), as represented by the ID of Figure 5.
Also, since U ⊥⊥ A in regime s, (11) holds, so s is a control strategy. Fi-
nally, in regime o, Y = 1 almost surely, while in regime s, Y = 0 almost surely.
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Because these are both degenerate distributions, trivially Y ⊥⊥ U | (A, σ), and
we have sequential irrelevance. However, because they are different distribu-
tions, Y 6⊥⊥ σ | A: so we do not have simple stability, (9). In particular, we can
not remove the arrow from U to Y in Figure 5, since this would encode the
false property Y ⊥⊥ σ | A. ⊓⊔
So, if we wish to deduce simple stability from extended stability and sequen-
tial irrelevance, further conditions, and a different approach, will be required.
In Theorem 6.2 of Dawid and Didelez (2010) it is shown that this re-
sult does follow if we additionally impose the extended positivity condition
of Definition 5.3; and then we need only require sequential irrelevance, (16),
to hold for the observational regime σ = o.
However, in § 6 below we show that, if we restrict attention to discrete
variables, no further conditions are required for this result to hold. In this
case, we need only require sequential irrelevance to hold for the interventional
regime σ = s.
6 Discrete case
In this section we assume all variables are discrete, and denote P (A = a, L = l)
by p(a, l), etc.
To control null events, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 6.1 Let all variables be discrete. Suppose that we have extended sta-
bility, (12), and let s be a control strategy, so that (11) holds. Then, for any
(uk, lk, ak) such that
Ak: p(lk, ak ; s) > 0, and
Bk: p(uk, lk, ak ; o) > 0, we have
Ck: p(uk, lk, ak ; s) > 0.
A
σ
Y
U
Fig. 5 Counter-example
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Proof Let Hk denote the assertion that Ak and Bk imply Ck. We establish
Hk by induction.
To start, we note that H0 holds vacuously.
Now suppose Hk−1 holds. Assume further Ak and Bk. Together these
conditions imply that all terms appearing throughout the following argument
are positive.
We have
p(uk, lk, ak ; s) = p(uk | lk, ak ; s) p(lk, ak ; s)
= p(uk | lk, ak−1 ; s) p(lk, ak ; s) (17)
=
p(uk, lk, ak−1 ; s)
p(lk, ak−1 ; s)
p(lk, ak ; s)
= p(uk, lk | uk−1, lk−1, ak−1 ; s)
×
p(uk−1, lk−1, ak−1 ; s) p(lk, ak ; s)
p(lk, ak−1 ; s)
= p(uk, lk | uk−1, lk−1, ak−1 ; o)
×
p(uk−1, lk−1, ak−1 ; s) p(lk, ak ; s)
p(lk, ak−1 ; s)
(18)
=
p(uk, lk, ak−1 ; o)
p(uk−1, lk−1, ak−1 ; o)
×
p(uk−1, lk−1, ak−1 ; s) p(lk, ak ; s)
p(lk, ak−1 ; s)
> 0.
Here (17) holds by (11) and (18) holds by (12). The induction is established.
⊓⊔
Theorem 6.1 Suppose the conditions of Lemma 6.1 apply, and, further, that
we have sequential irrelevance in the interventional regime s:
Li ⊥⊥ U i−1 | (Li−1, Ai−1 ; s) (i = 1, . . . , n+ 1). (19)
Then the simple stability property (9) holds.
Proof The result will be established if we can show that, for any li, we can
find a function w(Li−1, Ai−1) such that, for both σ = o and σ = s,
p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; σ) = w(li−1, ai−1)
whenever p(li−1, ai−1 ; σ) > 0.
This is trivially possible if either regime gives probability 0 to (li−1, ai−1).
So suppose p(li−1, ai−1 ; σ) > 0 for both regimes. Then
p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; o) =
∑
ui−1
′
p(li | ui−1, li−1, ai−1 ; o) × p(ui−1 | li−1, ai−1 ; o)
(20)
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where
∑′ denotes summation restricted to terms for which p(ui−1, li−1, ai−1 ; o) >
0—and so, by Lemma 6.1, p(ui−1, li−1, ai−1 ; s) > 0. Then by (12),
p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; o) =
∑
ui−1
′
p(li | ui−1, li−1, ai−1 ; s) × p(ui−1 | li−1, ai−1 ; o)
=
∑
ui−1
′
p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; s) × p(ui−1 | li−1, ai−1 ; o) (21)
= p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; s)
where (21) holds by (19). Thus we can take
w(li−1, ai−1) := p(li | li−1, ai−1 ; s)
to conclude the proof. ⊓⊔
Counter-example A.2 in the Appendix demonstrates that, even in this dis-
crete case, to deduce simple stability under the conditions of Lemma 6.1 it is
not sufficient to impose sequential irrelevance only for the observational regime
o.
7 Conclusion
The decision-theoretic approach to causal inference focuses on the possibilities
for transferring probabilistic information between different stochastic regimes.
In this paper we have developed a formal underpinning for this approach,
based on an extension of the axiomatic theory of conditional independence
to include non-stochastic variables. This formal foundation now supplies a
rigorous justification for various more informal arguments that have previously
been presented (Dawid, 1979a, 2002; Dawid and Didelez, 2010).
In applying this theory to the problem of dynamic treatment assignment,
we have shown how, and under what conditions, the assumptions of sequential
randomization or sequential irrelevance can support observational identifica-
tion of the consequence of some treatment strategy under consideration. This is
straightforward for sequential randomization, but somewhat less so for sequen-
tial irrelevance, where in general additional positivity conditions are required;
however, we have shown that these may be dispensed with when all variables
are discrete.
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A Appendix: The need for positivity
Counter-example A.1 The following counter-example illustrates what can go wrong when
we do not have positivity: even when a property such as (7) holds, we can not use just any
version of the conditional expectation in one regime to serve as a version of this conditional
expectation in another regime.
Consider a sequential decision problem of n = 2 stages with domain variables L1, A and
L2, where A is a binary variable with A = 0 denoting no treatment and A = 1 denoting
treatment. In the observational regime o, the treatment is never given: Po(A = 0) = 1; while
in the interventional regime s, the treatment is always given: Ps(A = 1) = 1. We thus have
failure of the positivity requirement of Definition 4.2.
Suppose that,in both regimes, L1 = 0 or 1 each with probability 1/2, and L2 = L1+A.
Then, with σ denoting the regime indicator taking values in S = {o, s}, we trivially have
L2 ⊥⊥ σ | (L1, A).
Now consider the variables
Wo =
{
L1 if A = 0
0 if A = 1
and
Ws =
{
2 if A = 0
L1 + 1 if A = 1.
Then Wo = L2 a.s. [P0], so Wo serves as a version of E(L2 |L1, A ; o); also Ws =
L2 a.s. [Ps], so Ws serves as a version of E(L2 |L1, A ; s). However, almost surely under
both Po and Ps, Wo 6=Ws, and neither of these variables supplies a version of E(L2 |L1, A)
simultaneously valid in both regimes. ⊓⊔
Counter-example A.2 In § 6 we have seen that, when all random variables are discrete
and the conditions of Lemma 6.1 are satisfied, in order to be able to deduce simple stability
it is sufficient to require sequential irrelevance only for the interventional regime. However,
without the positivity assumption simple stability does not follow if, additionally to the re-
quirements of Lemma 6.1, we instead require sequential irrelevance only for the observational
regime.
Consider a sequential decision problem of n = 2 stages with extended information base
I′ := (U,A, Y ). The joint distributions of the variables in I′ in the two regimes σ = 0 and
σ = s are supposed given by Table 1, where the probabilities are to be taken over 1500 (e.g.,
P (U = 0, A = 1, Y = 0 ; s) = 252/1500).
This problem does not exhibit extended positivity, since P (U = 1, A = 1;σ = o) = 0;
that is, in the observational regime, U = 1⇒ A = 0. Such a case might occur if, for example,
U represents a patient’s history of an allergic reaction to the treatment, which the doctor
under observation knows about and takes into account, deciding that presence of the allergy
should always preclude prescribing the treatment. However the allergy information is not
available to the decision-maker operating strategy s.
The reader may check that extended stability, (12), holds, viz. Y ⊥⊥ σ | U,A, and that
s is a control strategy: (11) holds, viz. A ⊥⊥ U | σ = s. Also, sequential irrelevance, (16),
holds for the observational regime, viz. Y ⊥⊥ U | A;σ = s, though not the interventional
regime, since Y 6⊥⊥ U | A = 1;σ = s. And now simple stability, (9), does not hold, since
Y 6⊥⊥ σ | A = 1. ⊓⊔
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σ = o σ = s
P (U = 0, A = 0, Y = 0) 135 180
P (U = 0, A = 0, Y = 1) 240 320
P (U = 0, A = 1, Y = 0) 50 25
P (U = 0, A = 1, Y = 1) 200 100
P (U = 1, A = 0, Y = 0) 315 252
P (U = 1, A = 0, Y = 1) 560 448
P (U = 1, A = 1, Y = 0) 0 98
P (U = 1, A = 1, Y = 1) 0 77
Table 1 Sequential irrelevance in the observational regime
